Navigating Chaos: Israel, Nuclear Ambiguity and the “Samson Option”

By Prof. Louis René Beres, March 10, 2024

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Israel’s ship of state, facing rough seas, is at high risk and requires clearer rules of navigation. During this period of deep complexity, Israel will need to clarify its strategic direction. The terrorists of Hamas are the tip of Iran’s much larger spear. Israel’s current war against jihadist criminality could thus turn into a wider and more damaging war with Iran. Such a war could emerge as a “bolt from the blue” or incrementally. Ultimately, it could involve the United States, Russia, China, Pakistan, and/or North Korea. How might Jerusalem prevent or manage any such derivative conflicts? Israel must consider whether there is a productive role to be played by the “Samson Option.” 

In any rationality-based strategic calculus, the “Samson Option” would refer not to a last-resort act of national vengeance but to a persuasive limit on existential threats. When taken together with Israel’s intentionally ambiguous nuclear strategy, an outdated doctrine commonly referred to as “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” or “Israel’s bomb in the basement” (amimut in Hebrew), more compelling threat postures could prove effective. To be truly promising, however, an Israeli Samson Option would need to 1) coincide with an incremental and selective end to “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” and 2) pertain to Iran directly, not just to terrorist proxies. There are no conceivable circumstances in which Samson could offer Israel useful applications regarding Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, or any other jihadist foes.

Israeli strategists will need to consider factors beyond what is taking place right now between Israel and its jihadist adversaries. Because military crises in other parts of the world could spill over into the Middle East, strategic planners should begin to clarify Israel’s operational preparations regarding Samson. This is especially the case

where a spill-over could involve the threat or actual use of nuclear weapons.

Though Iran is still “only” pre-nuclear, it already has the capacity to use radiation dispersal weapons and/or launch conventional rockets at Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor. Moreover, Tehran has close ties to Pyongyang, and it is not inconceivable that a nuclear North Korea might operate as a strategic stand-in for a not-yet-nuclear Iran.

For disciplined Israeli strategists, geopolitical context matters. There can be no logic-based assessment of probabilities because the events under consideration would be unprecedented. In logic and mathematics, true probabilities can never be ascertained ex nihilo, out of nothing. They can be drawn only from the determinable frequency of pertinent past events.

These are not narrowly political or intuitive calculations. As an operationally meaningful concept, the Samson Option references a residual deterrence doctrine founded upon credible threats (whether implicit or explicit) of overwhelming nuclear retaliation or counter-retaliation. These are unconventional threats (ancient Chinese strategist Sun-Tzu would call them “unorthodox”) to thwart more-or-less expected enemy state aggressions. Reasonably, any such massive last-resort doctrine could enter into force only where enemy aggressions would imperil Israel’s continued existence as a viable nation-state. In the absence of expected aggressions from Iran, Israel would more prudently rely upon an “escalation ladder.”

For doctrinal clarity, Israel’s nuclear forces should always remain oriented to deterrence ex ante, never to revenge ex post. Considered as potentially final elements of strategic dissuasion, it would do Israel little good to proffer Samson-level threats in response to “ordinary” or less than massive forms of enemy attack. Even where the principal operational object for Israel would be counter-terrorist success against Hamas, Hezbollah, etc., invoking Samson could make sense only vis-à-vis Hamas state patron Iran or Iran’s nuclear patron North Korea. In such nuanced calculations, assumptions of rationality could prove problematic.

For Israel’s nuclear deterrent to work against a still non-nuclear Iran, it is virtually inconceivable that it would need to include a Samson Option. In any crisis between Israel and Iran involving jihadist terror, Israel could almost certainly achieve “escalation dominance” without employing Samson. But if Iran were already an authentic nuclear adversary, its capacity to enhance surrogate terror capabilities would exceed any pre-nuclear constraints of competitive risk-taking. In these circumstances, Samson could prove necessary.

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https://besacenter.org/navigating-chaos-is

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